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Abstract
According to a minimalist version of Afriat’s theorem, a consumer behaves as a utility
maximizer if and only if a feasibility matrix associated with his choices is cyclically consistent.
An “essential experiment” consists of observed consumption bundles (x1, · · · , xn) and a fea-
sibility matrix α. Starting with a standard experiment, in which the economist has specific
budget sets in mind, we show that the necessary and sufficient condition for the existence
of a utility function rationalizing the experiment, namely, the cyclical consistency of the
associated feasibility matrix, is equivalent to the existence, for any budget sets compatible
with the deduced essential experiment, of a utility function rationalizing them (and typically
depending on them). In other words, the conclusion of the standard rationalizability test, in
which the economist takes budget sets for granted, does not depend on the full specification
of the underlying budget sets but only on the essential data that these budget sets generate.
Starting with an essential experiment (x1, · · · , xn;α), we show that the cyclical consistency
of α, together with a further consistency condition involving both (x1, · · · , xn) and α, guar-
antees that the essential experiment is rationalizable almost robustly, in the sense that there
exists a single utility function which rationalizes at once almost all budget sets which are
compatible with (x1, · · · , xn;α). The conditions are also trivially necessary.
JEL classification number : D11, C81.
Key words: Afriat’s theorem, budget sets, cyclical consistency, rational choice, revealed
preference.
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1 Introduction
Afriat (1967)’s theorem has been revisited in a few recent papers, which propose new proofs
(Fostel et al., 2004; Chung-Piaw and Vohra, 2003), extensions (Forges and Minelli, 2009) or new
interpretations (Ekeland and Galichon, 2010) of the result. In all these papers, as already in the
classical one (see, e.g., Varian, 1982), information on the choices of a given consumer at various
dates j = 1, · · · , n is summarized by an n× n feasibility matrix. The (j, k) entry of this matrix
takes the value −1, 0 or 1 and indicates to which extent the item (e.g., a consumption bundle)
that has been chosen by the consumer at date k is affordable or not at date j.1 According to
(a minimalist version of) Afriat’s theorem, the consumer behaves as a utility maximizer if and
only if the feasibility matrix satisfies a tractable property, referred to as “cyclical consistency”.
This version of Afriat’s theorem is recalled in Section 2 as Proposition 1.
In a standard framework, the observed choices of the consumer are bundles x1, · · · , xn ∈ R`+,
which define, together with the associated feasibility matrix, what we call in this paper an
“essential experiment”. To test the consumer’s rationality, the economist basically has to check
whether the feasibility matrix is cyclically consistent. When performing this test, the economist
typically has precise budget sets in mind for every date. As shown by Forges and Minelli
(2009), even if the budget sets are quite general (namely, just compact and comprehensive),
Afriat’s original constructive approach applies: if the feasibility matrix is cyclically consistent,
the economist can derive an explicit utility function rationalizing the data. This is another
version of Afriat’s theorem, which is stated in Section 3 as Proposition 2.
Not surprisingly, the above utility function depends on the economist’s budget sets. But,
especially if these budget sets are complex, e.g., involve tariffs or taxes, the consumer’s budget
sets (namely, the ones over which he possibly optimizes) might not fully coincide with the
economist’s ones. For instance, if the consumer buys small quantities of some good at every
date j = 1, ..., n, he may not understand that a low unit price is charged to large quantities of
that good.
We are thus led to the following question:
Given an essential experiment (x1, · · · , xn;α) in which the feasibility matrix α is cyclically
consistent, can we construct a utility function v which robustly rationalizes (x1, · · · , xn;α), in
the sense that v(xj) maximizes v over Bj , for any family (Bj) of budget sets compatible with
(x1, · · · , xn;α)?
1Denoting the feasibility matrix as α = (αjk), αjk = −1 if item k is affordable at date j without exhausting
the consumer’s revenue, αjk = 0 if item k is affordable at date j and exhausts the consumer’s revenue, αjk = +1
if item k is not affordable at date j.
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The motivation for such a utility function v is clear: v would not be sensitive to those specific
aspects of the budget sets that the consumer might not perceive.
First of all, we observe that the previous question is not meaningful unless the essential
experiment satisfies some basic consistency requirement guaranteeing that there indeed exists
(compact, comprehensive) budget sets that are compatible with it. We introduce the property
that the essential experiment “contains no contradictory statement” in order to capture such a
requirement.
Next, we construct an essential experiment (x1, x2;α) ∈ R2+ which contains no contradictory
statement, where α is cyclically consistent, and which cannot be rationalized robustly. This
simple example is by no means pathological and shows that, formulated exactly as above, the
question cannot be answered positively.
Nonetheless, we prove that every essential experiment (x1, · · · , xn;α) which contains no
contradictory statement and where α is cyclically consistent can be rationalized in an almost
robust way, in the sense that for every sufficiently small , there exist an almost largest fam-
ily (B) of budget sets compatible with (x1, · · · , xn;α) and a utility function v rationalizing
(x1, · · · , xn;α) over (B). It is not difficult to prove that, conversely, if (x1, · · · , xn;α) can be
rationalized in an almost robust way, then (x1, · · · , xn;α) contains no contradictory statement
and α is cyclically consistent. This is the main content of the theorem given in Section 4.
Our results can be interpreted in the standard framework where the economist starts with
a priori given budget sets. From these and the observed consumption bundles, one can deduce
an essential experiment. A by-product of the theorem (already contained in Proposition 2) is
that the necessary and sufficient condition for the existence of a utility function rationalizing the
economist’s budget sets (namely, the cyclical consistency of the feasibility matrix or the General-
ized Axiom of Revealed Preference - GARP -) is also equivalent to the existence, for any budget
sets compatible with the deduced essential experiment, of a utility function rationalizing them.
In other words, the conclusion of the standard rationalizability test, in which the economist
takes budget sets for granted, does not depend on the full specification of the underlying budget
sets but only on the essential data that these budget sets generate; the economist’s conclusion
automatically applies to a whole family of budget sets. This also means that there is no way
to test whether standard data - involving a full description of budget sets - are rationalizable
without testing at the same time that a whole class of data, based on a variety of different
budget sets, are also rationalizable.
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2 Essential data
Let α = (αjk)j,k∈N be a feasibility matrix as described in Introduction, i.e. an n× n matrix
with diagonal terms equal to 0 and remaining terms equal to −1,0 or 1, which summarize the
affordability of observed choices at each step. Given this essential data which can be identified
with a restricted choice experiment, a traditional question is to verify in which extent the choices
are consistent with the data, namely if there exists a rationalization. This amounts to finding
numbers vj , for every item j, such that vj ≥ vk for every affordable item k at date j, with strict
inequality if k does not exhaust entirely the revenue of the agent.
Definition 1 Utils (vj)j∈N are said to rationalize the feasibility matrix α, if, for every j ∈ N ,
vj ≥ vk for every k ∈ N such that αjk ≤ 0, and vj > vk for every k ∈ N such that αjk < 0.
The following tractable condition of cyclical consistency is the usual test to verify whether
or not an experiment can be rationalized.
Definition 2 An n × n real matrix A = (ajk)j,k∈N is cyclically consistent if for every chain
j, k, `, ..., r, ajk ≤ 0, ak` ≤ 0, ..., arj ≤ 0 implies all terms are 0.
In the framework of revealed preference analysis, the use of basic data α is not new, and
is the key ingredient to derive Afriat’s inequalities in the consumer problem. More precisely,
the role of the feasibility matrix is identified in the next result, which is actually implicit in the
classical Afriat (1967)’s theorem. For recent proofs see also Fostel et al. (2004); Chung-Piaw
and Vohra (2003); Ekeland and Galichon (2010).
Proposition 1 The following conditions are equivalent:
1. There exist utils (vi)i∈N rationalizing the feasibility matrix α.
2. The feasibility matrix α is cyclically consistent.
Proof [1.⇒ 2.] is proved in Ekeland and Galichon (2010, replacing Rij by αij in the proof of
3.⇒ 1. in Theorem 0). [2.⇒ 1.] is proved in Fostel et al. (2004, replacing A′ by α page 215).
Remark 1 Ekeland and Galichon (2010) derive a dual interpretation of matrix α in terms
of a market with n traders and an indivisible good (house) to be traded (see also Shapley and
Scarf (1974)). In the autarky allocation, each trader j owns house j. Matrix α summarizes
then preferences of traders in the initial autarky allocation: αjk = 1 is strict preference of his
own house over house k; αjk = −1 is strict preference of house k over his own house; αjk = 0
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is indifference of trader j between house k and his own house. In this dual interpretation,
Proposition 1 actually amounts to: the autarky allocation is a no trade equilibrium allocation
supported by prices pij = −vj (condition 1.) if and only if it is Pareto optimal (condition 2.).
3 Budget sets
From now on we turn to the single consumer problem with ` consumption goods, where utility
is now defined by a function v : R`+ → R. Hence, the economist observes consumption bundles
in addition to the essential data. This leads to the following notion of experiment which is
hereafter the basic data in our revealed preference analysis.
Definition 3 An essential (consumer) experiment (x,α) consists of observed consumption bun-
dles (xj)j∈N , xj ∈ R`++, and a feasibility matrix α.
We adopt a standard approach to model general budget sets. The formulation encompasses
the following cases: classical linear budget sets; budget sets defined by the intersection of linear
inequalities, as in Yatchew (1985); convex but non-linear budget sets, as in Matzkin (1991).
Therefore the budget of the consumer can result from the application of quantity constraints,
taxes and other sources of non convexities.
Besides compactness, the crucial requirement is monotonicity (condition A.2 in the definition
below).
Definition 4 A set Bj is a budget set if
A.1. Bj is a compact subset of R`+,
A.2. Bj is comprehensive from below in R`+; and if x ∈ FrBj then, for all k ∈ [0, 1), kx ∈
Bj \ FrBj.2
The next definition is the natural extension of the classical notion of experiment with linear
budget sets. First, the budget sets Bj are implicitly assumed to be known by the economist, who
will make inferences over the consumer’s choices. Second, consumption choices exhaust entirely
the available revenue, at each given date. Note that the latter fact is also implicitly assumed in
the classical theory, with linear budget sets defined by prices and the consumption choices at
each date.
2Given a set C ∈ R`+, let Fr C be the set {x ∈ C | {xk}+ R`++} ∩ C = ∅}.
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Definition 5 An experiment (x,B) consists of observed consumption bundles xj ∈ R`++ and of
budget sets Bj, such that xj ∈ FrBj for every j ∈ N .3
In the standard approach of revealed preference analysis, an experiment (x,B) is given.
This formulation implicitly assumes that a rational consumer perfectly knows his budget set Bj
for every j ∈ N . The economist is interested in testing whether the consumer chooses every
consumption bundle “rationally” given the budget sets at each date.
Definition 6 A utility function v is said to rationalize an experiment (x,B) if v(xj) = maxx∈Bj v(x)
for every j ∈ N .
Next we we describe how to relate budget sets and the matrix α in order to establish a
rationalizability test of the consumer problem in terms of essential data only.
Definition 7 Given an experiment (x,B), let Ax,B denote the n×n matrix with entries ax,Bjk =
−1 if xk ∈ intBj; ax,Bjk = 0 if xk ∈ FrBj; ax,Bjk = 1 if xk /∈ Bj.
An essential experiment (x,α) admits a budget representation if there exists a family of
budget sets (Bj)j∈N such that (x,B) is an experiment and Ax,B = α. A family (Bj)j∈N with
this property is said compatible with (x,α).
Given an experiment (x,B), the economist can deduce the corresponding essential experi-
ment by setting α = Ax,B. Alternatively, let us imagine that the essential experiment is the
only available one (the full sample may be too complex to be fully memorized or the consumer
privately knows his budget sets and the economist just obtains essential budgetary information
from the consumer, in a “thought experiment”). Under this interpretation, the essential ex-
periment (x,α) does not necessarily admit a budget representation. In the next section, we
introduce a tractable necessary and sufficient condition (“no contradictory statement”) for this
property to hold (see also Corollary 1 at the end of Section 4). For the time being, we just
assume that (x,α) admits a budget representation, as it is the case if the essential experiment
is simply deduced from some experiment (x,B).4
The next result can be deduced from Proposition 3 in Forges and Minelli (2009).
Proposition 2 Let (x,α) be an essential experiment which admits a budget representation. The
following conditions are equivalent:
3Note also that the definitions of budget set and experiment imply altogether that any budget set considered
hereafter has a nonempty interior.
4The reason why we postpone the introduction of the condition is simply to avoid repetitive arguments in the
proofs of Proposition 2 and Theorem 1.
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1. For any (Bj)j∈N compatible with (x,α), there exists a locally non satiated, continuous
utility function vB rationalizing the experiment (x,B).
2. The matrix α is cyclically consistent.
Proof [1. ⇒ 2.] Since (x,B) admits a budget representation, there exists a locally non
satiated, continuous utility function vB rationalizing an experiment (x,B) where Ax,B = α.
Hence, v(xj) ≥ v(xk) for every k such that αjk ≤ 0; with strict inequalities if αjk < 1, using
local non satiation. Then Proposition 1 gives the result.
[2.⇒ 1.] Since (x,α) admits a budget representation, it holds that α is cyclically consistent
iff (x,B) satisfies GARP, for every family (Bj)j∈N compatible with (x,α) using straightforward
arguments. Then apply Proposition 3 in Forges and Minelli (2009) to conclude the proof.5 In
particular, the construction of the utility functions relies on the following arguments: for every
compatible family (Bj)j∈N , construct continuous, monotone mappings (gBj )j∈N to describe the
budget sets as Bj =
{
x ∈ R`+ : gBj (x) ≤ 0
}
; use cyclical consistency of the matrix with entries
(gBj (xk))j,k∈N to derive inequalities a` la Afriat; and finally, thanks to these inequalities, construct
an explicit a utility function vB depending on the mappings (gBj )j∈N .
6 
The previous proposition sheds further light on the standard rationalizability test, which is
performed on the basis of the full experiment (x,B), but only uses the matrix Ax,B, equal here
to α. The economist designs the test with specific budget sets (Bj)j∈N in mind but ends up
checking the cyclical consistency (or rationalization) of the matrix α, which is equivalent to the
rationalization of a whole class of budget sets. By proceeding in this way, we get a different
utility function for every family of compatible budget sets. One can therefore question the
predictiveness of such a utility function, defined up to a family of budget sets. This motivates
the next section.
4 Robust rationalization
Let us start with an essential experiment (x,α). The following definition of robust rational-
ization naturally emerges from the discussion in Section 3: the utility function v rationalizes
robustly the experiment (x,α) if v rationalizes the experiment (x,B) for every family (Bj)j∈N
5The experiment (x,B) satisfies GARP if, for every j, k ∈ N , xkHxj implies xk /∈ intBj , where H is the
transitive closure of the direct revealed preference relation R: xkRxj if xj ∈ Bk. For easy constructive proofs of
the equivalence between GARP and the existence of a rationalization, see, e.g., Varian (1982) in the linear case
and Forges and Minelli (2009) in the general case.
6The matrix with entries (gBj (xk))j,k∈N is cyclically consistent iff the matrix A
x,B is cyclically consistent.
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compatible with (x,α). The existence of a robust rationalization amounts therefore to the exis-
tence of a largest family of budget sets compatible with the essential experiment. Unfortunately,
even if (x,α) is well behaved (in particular, α is cyclically consistent), such a family may not
exist as the next simple example illustrates.
Example Let
[
(x1, (α11, α12)), (x2, (α21, α22))
]
be an essential experiment such that α12 = 1,
α21 = −1 and x1 /∈ x2 + R`+. First, it is an easy matter to verify that the experiment admits
a budget representation (actually, x1 /∈ x2 + R`+ guarantees that there is no contradictory
statement). For instance define a compatible family as follows: B1 =
[{x1} − R`+]+ and B2 =[{x2} − R`+]+ ∪ [{x1 + ν1} − R`+]+ for some ν > 0 sufficiently small.7 8
Suppose now that x2 /∈ x1 +R`+, we can add a piece to the budget set B1 without modifying
the resulting matrix Ax,B. More precisely, there exists η > 0 such that, for all  ∈ (0, η), 11+x2 /∈
B1. Thus the family (B1, B

2), where B

1 = B1 ∪
[{( 11+x2} − R`+]+ and B2 = B2 is compatible
with the essential experiment. Suppose that there exists a well-behaved v rationalizing robustly
the essential experiment, then v rationalizes the experiments
(
(x1, B1), (x2, B

2)
)
for all  ∈ (0, η).
It follows that v(x1) ≥ v( 11+x2) since 11+x2 ∈ B1 and v(x2) ≥ v(x1) since x1 ∈ B2. From local
non satiation, v(x2) > v(x1) since x1 ∈ intB2 but this contradicts the continuity of v as  tends
to 0.
The previous experiment, which satisfies consumer’s rationality for any compatible family of
budget sets, is by no means pathological. Hence, we cannot hope for a robust rationalization.
To obtain a contradiction in the above construction we assumed that x2 /∈ {x1}+R`+. One can
define an analogue impossibility result in general provided that the essential experiment (x,α)
satisfies the equivalent requirement.
The previous example also shows that, by enlarging gradually a family of budget sets com-
patible with a given essential experiment (x,α), we get at the limit budget sets which are
well-behaved but are not compatible with (x,α) anymore. We will nevertheless achieve almost
robust rationalization, which we define precisely below.
Definition 8 Let (x,α) be an essential experiment. Let  > 0, the pair (B, v) where B is a
family of budget sets and v is a utility function, is said to -robustly rationalize (x,α) if:
(i). The family B is compatible with (x,α),
(ii). The function v rationalizes the experiment (x,B),
7Note that the essential experiment satisfies cyclical consistency and therefore (B1, B

2) satisfies GARP.
8For any set A ⊂ R`, let [A]+ denote the non negative subset of A, [A]+ = A ∩ R`+.
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(iii). For every family (Bj)j∈N compatible with (x,α), Bj ⊆ (1 + )Bj for every j ∈ N .
The justification for the terminology is that (ii) implies that v rationalizes experiment
(x,B), for every compatible family (Bj)j∈N included in B and, by (iii), every compatible
family is almost included in B. To show the former statement, note that xj is such that
v(xj) ≥ v(x) for all x ∈ Bj then a fortiori v(xj) ≥ v(x) for all x ∈ Bj ; and since xj ∈ Bj , it
follows that v rationalizes the experiment (x,B).
Taking again the essential experiment (x,α) as basic data, Propositions 1 or 2 tell us which
conclusion we can draw from the cyclical consistency of the matrix α but does not question the
compatibility between the consumer’s choices (xj)j∈N and α viewed as budgetary information,
namely whether there exists a family of budget sets (Bj)j∈N compatible with (x,α). This is the
purpose of the following tractable condition which will be used in the final result, jointly with
cyclical consistency.
Definition 9 An essential experiment (x,α) admits a contradictory statement if there exist
j, k, k′ ∈ N such that either [αjk < αjk′ and xk ≥ xk′] or [αjk = αjk′ = 0 and xk  xk′ ].
We are now in position to state our main result which provides the existence of a (-robust)
rationalization and a budget representation on the basis of essential experiment only, by putting
together the properties of cyclical consistency and (no) contradictory statement.9
Theorem 1 Let (x,α) be an essential experiment. The following conditions are equivalent:
1. There exist (Bi)i∈N compatible with (x,α) and a locally non satiated, continuous utility
function vB rationalizing the experiment (x,B).
2. The essential experiment (x,α) admits no contradictory statement and α is cyclically
consistent.
3. There exists η > 0 such that, for all  ∈ (0, η), there exists a locally non satiated, continuous
utility function v rationalizing -robustly the experiment (x,α).
Proof [1. ⇒ 2.] To show cyclical consistency of α proceed as in the proof of Proposition 2
(1.⇒ 2.). To show the property of non contradictory statement, suppose, first, on the contrary
that there exist j, k, k′ ∈ N such that [αjk < αjk′ and xk ∈ {xk′} + R`+]. Since (Bi)i∈N is
compatible with (x,α) we have either [xk ∈ intBj and xk′ /∈ intBj ] or [xk ∈ FrBj and xk′ /∈ Bj ]
9There is no hope to obtain testable restrictions in the consumer problem if one considers poorer information
than the one contained in essential experiments.
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together with xk ∈ {xk′}+ R`+, but this contradicts A.2. Second, suppose on the contrary that
there exist j, k, k′ ∈ N such that [αjk = αjk′ = 0 and xk ∈ {xk′} + R`++]. Since (Bi)i∈N is
compatible with (x,α) we have xk ∈ FrBj and xk′ ∈ FrBj with xk ∈ {xk′} + R`++, but this
contradicts again A.2.
[2. ⇒ 3.] Let m > 0 be such that xj ≤ m1 for every j ∈ N and define the following family
B = (Bj)j∈N (see also Figure 1):
10
Bj =
[(
int
(
(∪k∈N,αjk=0({xk}+ R`+))
⋃
(∪k∈N,αjk=1({
1
1 + 
xk}+ R`+))
))c ∩ ({m1} − R`+)]
+
x3 (α13 = 0)
x4 (α14 = 1)•
x2
(α12 = −1)
x1 (α11 = 0)•
••
•
m1•
1
1+x4
B1
Figure 1: Construction of the family (Bj)j∈N (here B

1)
By construction, each Bj is a budget set. Suppose now that there exists j ∈ N such that
xj /∈ FrBj for all  > 0. Since xj ∈ intBj implies αjj < 0, there exists necessarily k such
that either αjk = 0 and xk  xj or αjk = 1 and 11+xk  xj , for all  > 0. Since αjj = 0
this contradicts the fact that (x,α) admits no contradictory statement, (using  tends to 0 if
necessary). We have thus demonstrated that (x,B) is an experiment for a sufficiently small .
We show now that Ax,B

= α for a sufficiently small .
Let j, k ∈ N be such that αjk = −1. Suppose that there exists k′ such that xk ∈ {x′k} + R`+
with αjk′ = 0. But it is then a contradictory statement. Suppose that there exists k′ such
10The vector 1 is the vector of R` whose components are equal to 1.
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that xk ∈ { 11+x′k}+R`+ with αjk′ = 1 for all  > 0. As  tends to 0, this contradicts again
the fact that (x,α) admits no contradictory statement. Therefore there exists  > 0 such
that xk /∈ (∪k′∈N,αjk′=0({x′k} + R`+))
⋃
(∪k′∈N,αjk′=1({ 11+x′k} + R`+)). Thus xk ∈ intBj ,
that is ax,B

jk = −1.
Let j, k ∈ N such that αjk = 0. Suppose that there exists k′ such that xk ∈ {x′k}+ R`++ with
αjk′ = 0. Then it is then a contradictory statement. Suppose then that there exists k′
such that xk ∈ { 11+x′k}+R`+ with αjk′ = 1 for all  > 0. As  tends to 0, this contradicts
again the fact that (x,α) admits no contradictory statement. Therefore there exists  > 0
such that xk /∈ int
(
(∪k′∈N,αjk′=0({x′k}+R`+))
⋃
(∪k′∈N,αjk′=1({ 11+x′k}+R`+))
)
but clearly
belongs to (∪k′∈N,αjk′=0({x′k} + R`+))
⋃
(∪k′∈N,αjk′=1({ 11+x′k} + R`+)). Thus xk ∈ FrBj ,
that is ax,B

jk = 0.
Finally, let j, k′ ∈ N such that αjk′ = 1. Then clearly, for all  > 0, xk′ ∈ int
(
(∪k∈N,αjk=0({xk}+
R`+))
⋃
(∪k∈N,αjk=1({ 11+xk}+ R`+))
)
, that is to say xk′ /∈ Bj , i.e. ax,B

jk′ = 1.
It follows that there exists η > 0 such that, for all  ∈ (0, η) , (Bj)j∈N is compatible with
(x,α), as was to be proved.
Let η be the threshold as constructed above and let  ∈ (0, η). The construction of (Bj)j∈N
is such that for every compatible family (Bj)j∈N with (x,α), it holds that Bj ⊆ (1 + )Bj for
every j ∈ N . It remains to prove that one can construct a well behaved utility function v with
the desired properties. Using 2. and the fact that (Bj)j∈N is compatible with (x,α), Proposition
2 establishes the existence of a locally non satiated, continuous utility function v rationalizing
(x,B).
[3. ⇒ 1.] Consider the pair (v η2 , B η2 ) which rationalizes the experiment (x,α) η2 -robustly,
which is given by condition 3. Then a fortiori the well behaved function v
η
2 rationalizes the
experiment (x,B
η
2 ) as required by condition 1. 
Finally, using the proof of the previous result we also obtain the following corollary which
clarifies the role of contradictory statement:
Corollary 1 The two following conditions are equivalent:
1. The essential experiment (x,α) admits a budget representation
2. The essential experiment (x,α) admits no contradictory statement.
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